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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











TEMPLE UNIVERSITY; OFFICER MATTHEW HASSEL, BADGE #2237; OFFICER 
D. ALSTON, BADGE #2228; DETECTIVE ROBERT HASSEL, JR., BADGE #8153; 
DETECTIVE MICHAEL ACERENZA, BADGE #8153 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN 
DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Civ. Action No. 2:11-cv-00879) 
District Judge: Honorable Berle M. Schiller 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 13, 2012 
______________ 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., GREENBERG, and COWEN, Circuit Judges. 
 














GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
Lionel Franks (“Franks”) appeals the January 10, 2012 Order of the District Court 
granting summary judgment to all Defendants and dismissing Franks’s case.  For the 
following reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s Order. 
I. 
Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recount only the 
essential facts.  On the afternoon of April 9, 2010, Philadelphia Police Department 
officers responded to a shooting that took place outside of 3612 North 17th Street in 
Philadelphia.  A man was found lying on the sidewalk with several gunshot wounds.  
Three witnesses provided the investigating officers with similar descriptions of the 
shooter.  They described the shooter as a man between 5’7 and 5’10, with a thin to 
medium build, weighing between 165 and 170 pounds.  All three witnesses remembered 
his distinctive clothing — he was wearing a bright green sweat suit with white stripes 
down the sides of the jacket and pants.  None of the witnesses saw the shooter’s face.   
 
The police broadcasted a description of the shooter over the police radio.  Within 
minutes, Temple University Police Officer Matthew Hassel (“Officer Hassel”) observed a 
man matching the description of the shooter a few blocks away from the scene of the 
shooting.  The individual, Franks, was wearing a bright green sweat suit with white 
stripes down the sides, and was stopped and questioned.1
                                                 
1 Franks’s height, weight, race and gender also matched the description given to 
the police.   
  Franks claimed to have just 
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come from Olympia Sports, where he had purchased a new pair of sneakers.  Franks was 
carrying a bag with new shoes and a cell phone, and did not have any weapons on him. 
Philadelphia Police officers transported one of the witnesses, Valerie Logan 
(“Logan”), from the scene of the shooting to where Franks was being held.  Upon seeing 
Franks, Logan told the officers twice “that’s him.”  (App. 31, 38-39.)  Later, while giving 
her statement at the police station, Logan explained that even though she never saw the 
shooter’s or the suspect’s face, she “told [the police] it was the same person” because she 
“recognized the green sweat suit with the white stripes on it.”  (App. 102.)   
Based on Logan’s identification, Philadelphia Police Officer Scott Holmes told the 
Temple Police officers that Logan had made a “positive ID” of the suspect.  (App. 31, 
211-12, 226.)  Officer Hassel and Temple University Police Officer David Alston 
(“Officer Alston”) were instructed by a supervisor to place Franks under arrest, and they 
completed the initial arrest processing paperwork.  After this point, Officers Hassel and 
Alston had no further involvement in the investigation of the case. 
The investigation was assigned to Philadelphia Police Detectives Robert Hassel, 
Jr. (“Detective Hassel”)2
                                                 
2 Officer Hassel and Detective Hassel are not related. 
 and Michael Acerenza (“Detective Acerenza”).  After collecting 
Franks’s clothing, Detective Hassel noted that Franks’s sneakers had some red marks on 
them, which appeared to be blood, and the Detective sent them for testing by the Police 
Department’s forensic lab.  The Detectives also investigated Franks’s alibi — that he had 
been inside Olympia Sports purchasing a new pair of sneakers at the time of the shooting.  
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The shooting had occurred around 4:20 p.m.  The investigation revealed that Franks had 
been inside Olympia Sports close to the time of the shooting, but that there was a three-
minute delay in the store registers and video footage.  Therefore, even though the video 
surveillance showed Franks entering the store at 4:20:51, the time was more likely 
4:23:51.  The Detectives communicated this information to the Assistant District 
Attorney prosecuting the case, Bridget McVan (“ADA McVan”). 
The results of the forensic testing on Franks’s sneakers were detailed in a report 
dated June 4, 2010, which was sent to Detective Acerenza and ADA McVan.  The report 
indicated that only one sneaker had a sufficient quantity of the substance to submit for 
testing, and that while the sneaker tested positive for blood, the results were inconclusive 
as to whether the substance was human blood.  Detective Hassel did not become aware of 
the test results until after the June 4, 2010 report was sent to his colleague, and Franks 
has proffered no evidence suggesting that Hassel knew of the test results before he 
testified at the preliminary hearing.  ADA McVan, however, was in touch with the 
forensic lab during late April and early May and had requested an update on whether the 
substance on the sneakers was human blood prior to the preliminary hearing, scheduled 
for May 13, 2010.  The lab tests were completed on May 6, 2010, but the record does not 




The preliminary hearing was held in Philadelphia Municipal Court on May 25, 
2010.  Detective Hassel testified at the hearing.3  In response to ADA McVan’s 
questioning, he stated that “there appeared to be blood on one of the shoes” that Franks 
was wearing when he was arrested.  (App. 136.)  After the judge decided that there was 
sufficient evidence to hold Franks over for trial, ADA McVann, in the context of setting 
the bail amount, told the court that the substance on the sneakers had been tested and was 
human blood. 4
After DNA testing of the substance on Franks’s sneakers came back negative 
when matched to the victim’s DNA, all charges against Franks were dropped.   He was 
released from jail on August 31, 2010, after having been incarcerated for approximately 
five months. 
 
Franks brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Officers Hassel and Alston, 
and Detectives Hassel and Acerenza, alleging that they violated his Fourth Amendment 
right to be free from unreasonable seizures.5
                                                 
3 Detective Acerenza did not testify at the preliminary hearing. 
  The District Court granted summary 
4 Given that the lab report came back inconclusive for human blood, ADA 
McVan’s statement that the substance “has been tested” and “[is] human blood” seems to 
have been a misrepresentation.  (App. 162.)  However, ADA McVann is not named as a 
Defendant in this action.  The Parties agree that when she made this representation to the 
court, she was acting in a prosecutorial capacity and is therefore entitled to absolute 
immunity.  See Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 331-32 (3d Cir. 2011); Kulwicki v. 
Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1463-64 (3d Cir. 1992). 
5 Franks also named Temple University in his Complaint.  Temple University filed 




judgment to all Defendants in an Order dated January 10, 2012.  Franks timely appeals 
the District Court’s grant of summary judgment.   
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, using the same 
standard as the district court.  Pichler v. UNITE, 542 F.3d 380, 385 (3d Cir. 2008).  
Summary judgment is only appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a); see also United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 184-85 (3d Cir. 2011).  The 
reviewing court should view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party 
and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.  See Scheidemantle v. Slippery 
Rock Univ. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 470 F.3d 535, 538 (3d Cir. 2006).  We also review 
the grant of qualified immunity de novo as it raises a purely legal issue.  See Sharp v. 
Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir. 2012). 
III. 
Franks raises two arguments on appeal.  He argues that the District Court erred in 
granting summary judgment in favor of Officers Hassel and Alston because they lacked 
probable cause to arrest him and are not entitled to qualified immunity.  He also argues 
that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Detectives Hassel 




at Franks’s preliminary hearing, and failed to inform the court at the preliminary hearing 
of evidence allegedly corroborating Franks’s alibi.   
A. Officers Hassel and Alston 
Franks claims that Officers Hassel and Alston arrested him without probable cause 
because they relied exclusively on the similarity of Franks’s clothing to that of the 
suspect, and did not investigate Franks’s claim that he was in the Olympia Sports 
purchasing shoes at the time of the shooting.6
The District Court did not determine whether probable cause existed for Franks’s 
arrest, and instead based its grant of summary judgment on a finding that Officers Hassel 
and Alston are entitled to qualified immunity.  Qualified immunity shields government 
  The Fourth Amendment protects an 
individual from unreasonable searches and seizures, and in a criminal case, the “arrest 
and detention of a suspect is reasonable if it is supported by probable cause.”  Schneyder 
v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 322 (3d Cir. 2011).  “Probable cause demands that the police 
have reasonably trustworthy knowledge of facts ‘sufficient to warrant a prudent man in 
believing that the [arrestee] had committed or was committing an offense.’”  Id. at 323 
(alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 
(1964)); see also United States ex rel. Wright v. Cuyler, 563 F.2d 627, 630 (3d Cir. 1977) 
(“The question is whether the description of the assailants, as well as the time and 
geographic factors, were sufficient for a prudent man to believe that petitioner had 
committed the offense.” (citing Beck, 379 U.S. at 96-97)).   
                                                 
6 Franks brings claims of false arrest and false imprisonment under § 1983. 
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officials from civil damages liability “‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.’”  James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).  To determine whether an official is 
entitled to qualified immunity, courts ask whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff show 
the violation of a constitutional right, and whether that right was clearly established at the 
time of the alleged misconduct.  See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 236 (2009).   
The qualified immunity analysis “‘gives ample room for mistaken judgments by 
protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’”  
Marcavage v. Nat’l Park Serv., 666 F.3d 856, 860 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Hunter v. 
Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991)).  Therefore, as long as an official reasonably believes 
that his conduct does not violate the law, qualified immunity will shield that officer from 
liability.  See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244.  In the context of an arrest, the Supreme Court 
has dictated that officers “are entitled to immunity if a reasonable officer could have 
believed that probable cause existed to arrest” the suspect.  Hunter, 502 U.S. at 228. 
Franks was apprehended just blocks from the scene of the shooting, a few minutes 
after it occurred, wearing the same distinctive outfit as the shooter, and he otherwise 
matched the physical description of the shooter given by the three witnesses.7
                                                 
7 Franks’s gender, race, height, and weight/build matched the descriptions that all 
three witnesses gave to the police. 
  Moreover, 
Logan, an eyewitness to the crime, told Officer Holmes, “that’s him,” upon seeing 
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Franks.  Thus, contrary to Franks’s arguments, Officers Hassel and Alston relied on more 
than just Franks’s clothing and Logan’s identification in making the arrest. 8  “These 
undisputed facts establish that [Officers Hassel and Alston] are entitled to qualified 
immunity.  Even if we assumed, arguendo, that they . . . erred in concluding that probable 
cause existed to arrest [Franks], [they] nevertheless would be entitled to qualified 
immunity because their decision was reasonable, even if mistaken.”  Hunter, 502 U.S. at 
228-29 (citing Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641).9
 B. Detectives Hassel and Acerenza 
 
 Franks argues that Detectives Hassel and Acerenza made false statements at his 
preliminary hearing and failed to tell the court of the video footage from the Olympia 
                                                 
8 Franks spends a significant amount of his brief arguing that Logan’s 
identification should not have been considered a “positive identification” because she 
could not make a facial identification.  However, this argument is misplaced.  He cites no 
precedent to support his contention that a witness cannot identify a subject based on 
characteristics other than facial features.  Nor does his reliance on Wilson v. Russo, 212 
F.3d 781, 789-91 (3d Cir. 2000), provide succor.  The relevant question is whether, given 
all the information in the officers’ possession, a reasonable officer could have believed 
that probable cause for the arrest existed.  See Hunter, 502 U.S. at 228.  We have 
previously held that probable cause for an arrest exists “where the description included 
race, height, weight, color of hair, distinctive type of hair styling, precise color of 
clothing, and the suspects were apprehended near the scene of the crime one night after it 
had occurred.”  Cuyler, 563 F.2d at 630.  Here, the description included gender, race, 
height, weight, distinctive clothing, and the arrest occurred minutes after the crime, 
blocks away from where the shooting occurred.  The arresting officers relied on all of this 
information — not just Logan’s identification — in making their probable cause 
determination.   
9 We do not suggest that the officers’ belief was mistaken; we merely do not reach 




Sports, which was potentially exculpatory.  Franks has failed to state a legally cognizable 
claim against Detectives Hassel and Acerenza.10
 Detective Acerenza did not testify at Franks’s preliminary hearing.  To establish 
liability under § 1983, each individual defendant “must have personal involvement in the 
alleged wrongdoing,” which can be shown “through allegations of personal direction of 
or actual knowledge and acquiescence.”  Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 
2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The record contains no evidence that Detective 
Acerenza had any personal involvement in Detective Hassel’s allegedly perjured 
testimony at Franks’s preliminary hearing.
 
11
 Franks seeks to hold Detective Hassel liable for the contents of Hassel’s testimony 
to the court during Franks’s preliminary hearing.  However, a witness, including a police 
  Therefore, summary judgment was properly 
granted in favor of Detective Acerenza. 
                                                 
10 Detectives Hassel and Acerenza argue that Franks has waived his claims against 
them on appeal because he has not properly presented these claims in his opening brief, 
in violation of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28.  “‘It is well settled that if an 
appellant fails to comply with [the requirement of setting forth an issue in the Statement 
of the Issues and Argument sections], the appellant normally has abandoned and waived 
that issue on appeal and it need not be addressed by the court of appeals.’”  Johnson v. 
City of Phila., 665 F.3d 486, 495 n.13 (alteration in original) (quoting Kost v. 
Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993)).  The Detectives’ argument is without merit 
because Franks, over many pages in his brief, has laid out the factual basis for his appeal, 
and has provided at least some supporting caselaw.  Although Franks’ Argument section 
does not clearly lay out the legal theory under which he is proceeding, we will consider 
his claims against Detectives Hassel and Acerenza because he challenges the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment in their favor in his opening brief.  See id.       
11 Although a copy of the forensic lab report was mailed to Detective Acerenza, 
this report was not completed and mailed until June 4, 2010, well after the preliminary 
hearing was conducted. 
11 
 
officer, “has absolute immunity with respect to any claim based on the witness’ 
testimony.”  Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1505-06 (2012) (holding that witnesses 
who testify before the grand jury enjoy absolute immunity from civil liability for their 
testimony); see also Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 345-46 (1983) (holding that trial 
witnesses, including police officers, are absolutely immune from civil liability for claims 
based on their testimony).  We have long held that the doctrine of absolute witness 
immunity applies to testimony given at pre-trial hearings.  See Williams v. Hepting, 844 
F.2d 138, 141-43 (3d Cir. 1988).  Therefore, Detective Hassel is entitled to absolute 
immunity for his testimony during Franks’s preliminary hearing.12
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s Order. 
 
                                                 
12 Although the District Court did not base its grant of summary judgment on the 
absolute immunity doctrine, “we may affirm the District Court based on any grounds 
supported by the record.”  Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc).  
We note, however, that we agree with the District Court that Franks’s claim would fail on 
the merits because Franks has proffered no evidence of wrongdoing by Detective Hassel.   
